This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves� through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge� is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative “pluralist� position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic� treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.