Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms For Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances - ENG
| ISBN: | 9783642358227 |
|---|---|
| Formato: | ePub |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Editorial: | Springer Nature |
| Tema: | Negocios y economía |
| Subtema: | Investigación operacional |
| Año de publicación: | 2013-04-03 |
​A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.










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