Populist parties in Europe attract many more votes than they did just a few  decades ago and are now much more likely to govern. They have also become key  players in the international sphere. At the same time, the relationship between  democracy and populism is subject to substantial scholarly and public debate.  This raises questions about opposition to this controversial set of political  actors: do opponents favour the use of rights-restricting and  exclusionary repertoires typical of ‘militant democracy’ responses to anti- democratic or extremist parties? Or do opponents favour the ordinary, persuasive  and sometimes inclusive strategies more typical of the daily conduct of liberal  democratic politics? To what extent is opposition conceived of as democratic  defence? How do strategies vary among countries and in relation to different  types of populist parties? How do international and transnational actors respond? Addressing these questions, the book presents new research mapping opposition  to the Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz), Law and Justice in Poland, Alternative for  Germany, League and Five Start Movement in Italy, Podemos and Vox in Spain,  the Sweden Democrats and the Danish People Party. It argues that opposition  to populist parties in contemporary Europe is, in most cases, best conceived of as  democratic defence as normal politics. That is, while there is no direct link  between populism and a decline in democratic quality, critical claims justifying  acts of opposition often problematise populist parties as threats to  liberal democratic principles and values. At the same time, opponents are  more likely to respond to populist parties using the repertoires of normal  politics – or strategies typically employed against less controversial  groupings – than the exceptional, rights-restricting instruments typically used  against extremists. The case of Alternative for Germany, in which exceptional  politics continues to guide much opposition, remains a case apart.